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ABSTRACT
A stated aim in the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to work with
partners in addressing crises across the world. This article analyses
such potential in the area of crisis response and peacebuilding,
with an emphasis on the EU’s interaction with the UN and OSCE.
It starts oﬀ comparatively by examining where the EU, UN and
OSCE add value in crisis response and peacebuilding and reach
complementarities. It shows that deployments diﬀer across
geographical locations and that the mandates of these
organizations vary considerably with the EU focusing on police
capacity building, the OSCE on the judiciary and the UN providing
monitoring functions. In the second half, the article uses insights
from cooperation between these organizations on the ground in
Kosovo, Mali and Armenia to determine levels of interaction.
Despite relatively few conﬂicts between these organizations, we
ﬁnd that they continue to work in parallel with each organization
focusing on their narrow mandate and competences.
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Introduction
A stated aim in the recent EU Global Strategy (2016) is for the European Union (EU) to
work with partners in addressing crises across the world. The EU cannot make dinner and
do the dishes (cf. Kagan, 2003). It needs to work with reliable partners in conﬂict preven-
tion, crisis management and peacebuilding. This article evaluates the complementarity
and synergies between the EU, United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in civilian crisis response. These organizations are three
of the largest actors in terms of civilian deployments. It argues that while there is potential
for complementarity, as a result of a degree of geographical and functional diﬀerentiation
between these three organizations, day-to-day synergies remain limited. The article pro-
vides empirical evidence from ﬁeldwork in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia.
The EU is a relatively recent actor in civilian crisis response–its ﬁrst civilian mission in
the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was only launched in
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2003. It has established itself nevertheless as a serious security actor. While it is not
straightforward to compare “missions” by the EU, UN and OSCE because they diﬀer con-
siderably,1 the EU has taken over the OSCE in terms of civilian deployments (see Figure 1).
Both remain, however, small compared to the approximately 17,000 deployed civilians as
part of the UN peacekeeping and political missions. Most importantly, all three organiz-
ations have established themselves permanently in the ﬁeld of crisis response. Even though
the OSCE faced decline during the 2000s, its large-scale mission in Ukraine since 2014
shows again its relevance.
The ﬁrst section of this article provides new data on the geographical and functional
diﬀerentiation of the three organizations. It shows that while they are all active in civilian
crisis response, they do not do the same things with the EU focusing on police capacity
building, the OSCE on the judiciary and the UN providing monitoring functions. The
second section provides evidence of day-to-day synergies in Kosovo, Mali and
Armenia.2 While the EU is the lead international actor in Kosovo and a signiﬁcant
actor in Mali, it is a secondary actor in Armenia. The article shows that in these countries
the EU, UN and OSCE largely work in parallel. Where they provide support for each other,
it is mostly diplomatic support through statements or ﬁnancial support for projects. There
is hardly any material support in terms of personnel and equipment exchanges. This
shows the clear limits in terms of synergies.
Complementarities in crisis response and peacebuilding
While the EU, UN and OSCE are three prominent actors in civilian crisis response, they
operate in fact in diﬀerent geographical theatres and also have diﬀerent sorts of mandates.
Such geographical and functional diﬀerentiation potentially allows for complementarities
and synergies between these organizations, as they are not obvious rivals. This section ﬁrst
discusses geographical diﬀerentiation before turning to functional diﬀerentiation. As such
it provides a rare comparative perspective on what these three organizations do in civilian
conﬂict response.3 This empirical analysis forms the basis for the in-depth case study
analysis in the second half of the article.
Figure 1. UN, EU and OSCE deployments. Sources: UN peacekeeping website, SIPRI Yearbooks and
OSCE annual reports.
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It does not come as a surprise that the EU, UN and OSCE prioritize diﬀerent geographi-
cal regions in the area of crisis response. Yet it is useful nonetheless to provide a full over-
view. Figure 2 shows the total number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per geographical
region in 2015. It is clear that Africa has the strongest presence of the international com-
munity, with 19 civilian missions, closely followed by Europe with 18. There are nine mis-
sions in Central Asia, six in the Middle East and one mission in Haiti. In terms of the
geographical division of labour, it is worth noting that the UN, as a universal international
organization, is present in all regions. The OSCE is only present in its participating states
and Kosovo. The EU has a signiﬁcant presence in its immediate but increasingly also wider
neighbourhood. To understand how this geographical diﬀerentiation came about we need
to discuss these organizations individually.
The EU deployment patterns are a reﬂection of diﬀerent issues. First, the CSDP was
established during the late 1990s as a reaction to the inadequate response of the EU to
the wars in former Yugoslavia (Deighton, 2002; Howorth, 2001; Hunter, 2002). Unsurpris-
ingly, the EU has a strong presence in the Western Balkans, but also Ukraine and Georgia.
Second, EU member states have had diverse interests in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of
their colonial pasts. Coupled with the ambition of some member states for the CSDP to be
more than a regional policy, this has resulted in missions in Democratic Republic of
Congo (Gegout, 2005; Olsen, 2009; Vines, 2010). Third, as the EU is a member of the
Middle East Peace Process, it has also made niche capabilities available in the Palestinian
Territories (Bouris, 2012). Finally, more recently, the EU takes a more strategic approach
to its deployments with police training in Afghanistan, counter-piracy missions oﬀ the
coast of Somalia, capacity-building missions (to combat terrorism) in the Sahel region,
and the anti-human traﬃcking mission oﬀ the coast of Libya (Biscop, 2016; Germond
& Smith, 2009; Skeppström, Wiklund, & Jonsson, 2015).
The situation is diﬀerent in the UN, where peacekeeping and political operations largely
follow some of the world’s major conﬂicts (as well as the interests of the permanent ﬁve
Figure 2. Number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per region in 2015. Sources: UN peacekeeping website,
SIPRI Yearbooks, OSCE annual reports. The regions include the Americas, Europe including the Cauca-
sus, Africa, Middle-East and Asia (from left to right). For visual reasons, the size of the pie-charts is not
completely proportional to the total number of missions in each region.
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members of the Security Council) (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Ruggeri, Dorussen, &
Gizelis, 2016; also Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). Africa is, in this
respect, the continent with the highest number of missions (in Central African Republic,
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali,
Somalia, South Sudan, two missions in Sudan, Western Sahara and regional missions in
Central Africa and West Africa). The other regions host comparatively fewer missions
but, with the highest number of missions in general, the UN is still an active player in
all of them. Namely, at the time of writing, four missions were deployed in the Middle
East (in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and a regional truce mission covering the whole region),
three in Asia (in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and regional mission in Central
Asia), two in Europe (Cyprus and Kosovo) and, as mentioned above, one in Haiti.
Finally, the OSCE activities are concentrated in its participating states in Europe and
Central Asia. It started deploying “missions of long duration” in the Western Balkans
in 1992 as well as transition missions in the newly independent former Soviet states
(Bellamy & Griﬃn, 2002; Galbreath, 2007). As can been seen in Figure 2, OSCE missions
are dominant in both regions. No fewer than 13 missions are located in Europe (in
Albania, Baku, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, to Minsk Conference, in Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Serbia, Skopje, Yerevan, and three missions inside Ukraine or at Ukrainian-
Russian border) and ﬁve missions in Central Asia (Astana, Ashgabat, Bishkek, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan). It is important, however, to point out that OSCEmissions are often small
deployments. They also often carry out functions that in the EU fall under the responsi-
bility of the local EU Delegations rather than civilian CSDP.
Whereas the geographical diﬀerentiation between the EU, UN and OSCE is not entirely
surprising, an important question is what these missions actually do. Here we ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences between these three organizations (see Figure 3). On the basis of the
formal mandates of ongoing missions in 2015, we have inductively identiﬁed 10 major cat-
egories of conﬂict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding functions. Overall, an
Figure 3. Tasks of EU, UN and OSCE ongoing missions mentioned in their formal mandates (as of 31
December 2015). 100% implies that all ongoing missions of organization A carry out task Z.
4 H. DIJKSTRA ET AL.
average civilian mission deployed by the EU, UN and OSCE carried out 3.15 tasks. Con-
trary to popular wisdom on the comprehensive approach and multidimensional missions,
this actually shows that the missions’ mandates tend to be focused on a particular task/
sector.
In comparison to the UN and OSCE, the EU deploys relatively focused civilian mis-
sions. An average EU mission in 2015 was mandated with only 2.18 tasks. The most
common task is support to police, with just over half of the missions carrying it out (6
of 11 missions), followed by Security Sector Reform (SSR) and border management
(each by 4 of the 11 missions). Four other tasks are each carried out by two diﬀerent
EU missions each: anti-terrorism / anti-piracy activities, support to judiciary, mediation,
and support to armed forces. Only one mission is responsible for monitoring the
implementation of a peace agreement (Georgia) and none of the missions deal with Dis-
armament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
The situation is diﬀerent for the UN, which has the most comprehensive missions of the
three organizations – on average 3.63 tasks per mission. It is also the only organization
which covered all 10 identiﬁed tasks across its missions. For the UN, the most common
task by far is the monitoring of peace agreements, conducted by 18 of 24 missions.
Similar to the EU, support to police is also an important component (15 missions). SSR
followed with 11 missions; and DDR, and support to both police and judiciary were
dealt with by 10 missions. Other tasks were less common: riot control was carried out
by six missions, support to armed forces by three missions, and both counter-terrorism
and anti-piracy activities and border management by two missions.
Finally, the OSCE missions are situated in between the EU and UN with regard to the
breadth of their activities. On average they carry out 3.11 tasks. Contrary to the UN and
especially to the EU, support to the judiciary is the most common task, with 14 of 18
OSCE missions addressing this. Almost equally important is support to police, in line
with the other two organizations, with 12 missions working in this ﬁeld. Counter-terror-
ism and anti-piracy activities as well as border management were also rather common
tasks, although slightly less so, with respectively eight and seven missions addressing
them. Other activities were less common: mediation was carried out by ﬁve missions;
monitoring, support to armed forces and SSR by three; and only one mission dealt
with DDR. Finally, riot control was not part of the mandate of any OSCE mission,
which is unsurprising given the lack of executive functions possessed by the
organization.
While the picture on geographical and functional diﬀerentiation is not entirely neat,
civilian crisis response by the EU, UN and OSCE seems to be much more about com-
plementarity than overlap and competition (cf. Brosig, 2011; Lynch, 2009; Novosseloﬀ,
2012; Tardy, 2005; Van Willigen & Koops, 2015). There are undoubtedly instances of
friction between the EU and OSCE in Europe and the EU and UN in Africa and
some functions are prioritized by all three organizations, but on the whole there
seems to be a division of labour, albeit informal. The UN is the go-to organization
when it comes to monitoring, mediation and DDR, and the OSCE has strong expertise
on the judiciary. The tasks of the EU in civilian CSDP are limited to police, SSR and
border management. These complementarities in civilian crisis response are important,
because they potentially allow for clear synergies by the international community in
actual operating theatres.
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 5
Inter-organizational synergies in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia
To study how the complementarities between the EU, UN and OSCE can actually be uti-
lized, we conducted 29 interviews on the ground in Kosovo (Pristina), Mali (Bamako) and
Armenia (Yerevan). These cases were selected as a result of the varying role of the EU. The
EU is the most important international civilian actor in Kosovo, through its rule of law
mission (EULEX) and the political work by the EU Delegation and Special Representative.
As such it is more prominent than the hollowed out UN mission (UNMIK) and the
smaller presence of the OSCE (Eckhard & Dijkstra, 2017). In Mali, the EU is a signiﬁcant
actor as a result of its two CSDP missions. It works, in this respect, alongside the UN
peacekeeping mission which is the key security actor. In Armenia, the EU is much
more of a secondary actor. The OSCE takes the lead both in terms of the conﬂict with
Azerbaijan and in SSR activities. The EU plays a supportive role, including through
funding, whereas the UN mostly concentrates on development functions.
In terms of synergies, we analyse how these three international organizations concretely
work together to achieve common objectives (on inter-organizational relations, see Bier-
mann & Koops, 2017). We focus, in this respect, not just on coordination, but also on the
actual exchange of civilian capabilities, such as diplomatic and political support for each
others’ work, project funding, exchanges of staﬀ, and use of equipment. We ﬁnd that
across the case studies synergies are limited. Coordination itself is already a challenge
for these organizations, and the exchange of capabilities is limited to diplomatic and pol-
itical support and occasional extra-budgetary project funding. As such, there is much
more potential for actual synergies between these organizations on the ground.
In terms of coordination, there are uneven practices. In Kosovo, despite the political
diﬃculties between the EU, UN and OSCE (Dijkstra, 2011; Visoka & Bolton, 2011),
there are various channels for coordination between the respective missions. The
UNMIK interagency Monday morning meetings have survived from pre-independence
times when the UN mission consisted of diﬀerent “pillars” for which the EU, OSCE
and other international actors each had responsibility. Only UNMIK and OSCE,
however, send Heads of Missions to these meetings, while other participating organiz-
ations are represented by lower-level staﬀ (interview #10). Meetings are also regularly
organized between the chiefs of staﬀ of the diﬀerent missions, as are meetings between
counterparts from the diﬀerent rule of law sections (police, judiciary, etc.). These meetings
are not used for strategic planning, but to discuss more practical issues, such as situational
relations and staﬃng (interview #9). Despite the organization of all these regular formal
meetings, it appears, however, that the most important interactions between the Heads
of Missions take place over ad hoc informal lunches.
Because of the lower number of international actors present in Mali, coordination often
takes the form of direct liaison between the UN and EU missions. The intensity of coordi-
nation is, however, lower. For instance, a strategic meeting is held every three months
between EU Head of Mission and UN Police Commissioner to identify strategic objectives
and possible actions at political and national levels to support mandate implementation.
At lower levels, a monthly technical meeting is held between EU Head of Operations and
UN Deputy Police Commissioner, whereas technical experts have more frequent
exchanges (interviews #15 and #17). Furthermore, liaison oﬃcers have been appointed
to improve communication between the EU mission and the UN Police Component. In
Armenia, in contrast, coordination is limited. While there is regular donor coordination
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run by the UN Development Programme, there is no coordination between international
organizations in the area of SSR. The EU and OSCE simply avoid getting in each other’s
way. While there are some exchanges regarding the mediation of the OSCE in the conﬂict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this takes place at the level of headquarters–Brussels,
Vienna, and New York.
Tangible synergies come in the form of political and diplomatic support. For instance, the
OSCE is leading mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but its role is contested. Fol-
lowing the Four DayWar in April 2016, the two conﬂicting parties, for instance, have asked
for other (stronger) international organizations to take over and for the inclusion of more
regional powers in the process (e.g. Turkey). The EU andUNhave, in this respect, used their
diplomatic clout to support the authority of theOSCE. For instance, the EUHigh Represen-
tative, Federica Mogherini, attends the OSCE Ministerial Meetings and has expressed the
EU’s explicit support for the eﬀorts of the OSCE Minsk Group and its three co-chairs
(Mogherini, 2016a, 2016b). Such public support is signiﬁcant, also because it shows the
two parties that there is no alternative. It helps to increase the authority of the OSCE.
In Kosovo, at a lower level of diplomatic support, an interviewee (#10) described an
instance of, what can be called, “logo switching”. International organizations tend to
shift visible support for certain programme, depending on which side in conﬂict they
are primarily seeking to address. The UN ﬂag is auspicious for the Serbian side, but
UNMIK does not enjoy popularity among central authorities in Pristina. There have
been instances of UNMIK and OSCE co-organizing an event, when UNMIK would
provide more funding, but only the OSCE logo would be visible, in order to attract
Kosovar institutions. The EU may use its logo to lend support to the other international
organizations, even if it is not funding their activities. For instance, the EU provided the
Media Justice Transparency Initiative of the OSCE with such support, while its contri-
bution was limited to the simple participation of EULEX judges in panel discussions
among Kosovar judiciary and journalists.
When it comes to ﬁnancial support for each other’s work, the EU member states pay a
signiﬁcant share of the UN peacekeeping (32%) and OSCE budget (70%), yet since they do
not channel such resources through the EU (funding goes directly from the member states
to the UN and OSCE), the EU does not have any leverage. This stands in contrast to, for
instance, the African Peace Facility, through which the EU disburses several hundreds of
million euros each year to African Union peace operations. Yet apart from regular
funding, the EU (excluding its member states) is the largest extra-budgetary contributor
to the OSCE. In 2016, it spent 9.5m euros on all OSCE projects (about 28% of the total
project budget) (OSCE, 2017). This is meaningful, given that the OSCE Uniﬁed Budget
is only about 142m euros/year, yet it does not make the OSCE fully dependent on the
EU either.
The logic of much of the EU’s ﬁnancial support is that the EU is principally a donor and
not a do-er. For the implementation of projects, it typically recruits a partner, which can be
a NGO but also another international organization, such as the UN, OSCE or Council of
Europe. In Kosovo, for instance, the United Nations Oﬃce for Project Services (UNOPS)
has been selected by the EU to construct border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo. It
was selected not just for its previous experience and knowhow, but also because the UN is
status-neutral and thus a UN agency is more acceptable for Serbia (interview #9). In the
case of Armenia, while the EU does currently not fund SSR projects by the OSCE, it is
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worth pointing at the EU’s accompanying measures for the OSCE mediated peace process
with Azerbaijan. Through the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the
Conﬂict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), the EU funds people-to-people projects
(track II diplomacy). This is therefore indirect support for the OSCE-led process.
When going beyond diplomatic support and funding, exchanges of capabilities are
more limited. The EU, UN and OSCEmake some use of each other’smission support capa-
bilities, but this is largely on an ad hoc basis. For instance, the EU makes occasional use of
the enablers of the UN and OSCE, as it does not always a nationwide presence. In Mali,
where the EU’s activities are mostly capital-based, the UN collects, analyses and provides
intelligence products to relevant partners, including embassies and the EUmissions (inter-
view #13). We see a similar situation in North Kosovo, where the EU makes use of the
OSCE and UNMIK presence in the ﬁeld for monitoring and reporting. This includes par-
ticularly monitoring the position of minorities. The information from the OSCE and
UNMIK monitoring reports is integrated into the reports that the EU sends to the
EEAS (interviews #9 and 10). While the EU could potentially collect such information
itself, it is useful to avoid duplications in this case.
The further potential for synergies in terms of mission support also becomes clear when
looking at the military cooperation in Mali between the EU and the UN. Because it is pre-
ferred for the Malian armed forces to be trained by the EU close to their deployment areas
(in Northern Mali), the EU has been in extensive negotiations with the UN on a memor-
andum of understanding. This would allow the UN to provide logistical support and local
facilities for the EU training mission to extend its presence into Gao and Kidal in the north
(interviews #12, #13, #14 and #19). Yet it has not been straightforward to put the necessary
exchange of capabilities in place. This highlights the possible obstacles for synergies, also
in civilian crisis response, which go beyond diplomatic support and funding.
Finally we have not found any cases of exchange in personnel between these organiz-
ations, such as temporary (short-term) secondments, the provision of (speciﬁc) expertise,
or back up staﬀ in case of emergencies. This is slightly surprising given that the EU
member states provide 55% of OSCE international staﬀ in ﬁeld missions (OSCE, 2017,
p. 109), that much of the staﬀ is seconded, and that many staﬀ members work during
their career for diﬀerent international organizations in the ﬁeld. If there are any synergies
in terms of the use of staﬀ across international organizations, it is largely at the member
state level, where civilian staﬀ is typically recruited and trained for all international mis-
sions (Dijkstra, Petrov, & Mahr, 2016).
Conclusion
The EU aims to work together with key international partners in crisis response and
peacebuilding. This article has evaluated the complementarity and synergies with UN
and OSCE in terms of civilian capabilities. On the whole, the eﬀort of these three inter-
national organizations is largely complementarity. We have identiﬁed both geographical
and functional diﬀerentiation in their work. While we cannot speak of a formal division
of labour, it is clear that the EU, UN and OSCE also are in a (permanent) state of com-
petition. At the same time, we have shown–based on ﬁeldwork in Kosovo, Mali and
Armenia–that actual synergies between these organizations remain limited. The unity of
eﬀort remains largely a parallel exercise with less-than-extensive coordination and/or
exchanges in capabilities.
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To a certain extent these ﬁndings are not entirely surprising. Even when ignoring for a
moment all sorts of political considerations, the EU, UN and OSCE are already short on
civilian capabilities themselves. So if capabilities are to be donated to other international
organizations, it should be for a good reason. For instance, the EU prides itself of
(occasionally) donating armoured vehicles to the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine
(OSCE, 2016) or making funding available for EU satellite imagery (European Commis-
sion, 2017). It helps, in this respect, that Ukraine is high on the EU agenda. At the same
time, one wonders whether it would not be eﬃcient to provide such support on a more
structural basis. Indeed, if the EU really wants to put partnerships central as part of the
EU Global Strategy, it would be worth redirecting some resources–including from the
multi-billion Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace–to other international
organizations.
At the same time, the analysis also makes clear that resources are not the only challenge.
Exchanges and synergy can potentially result in dependencies between international
organizations, which in turn reduces the autonomy of international organizations to
make decisions and their ability to act (e.g. Biermann, 2017; Harsch, 2015). As such,
most of the exchanges we have identiﬁed are either unidirectional (e.g. the EU providing
funding to the OSCE), ad hoc (e.g. use of logos in Kosovo), or informally coordinated
(Gebhard & Smith, 2015) (e.g. EU parallel support for OSCE in Armenia). Establishing
more permanent exchanges and synergies, such as in the case of Mali, have proved
more challenging.
Notes
1. “Missions” in this article include civilian and civilian-military CSDP missions of the EU,
peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions of the UN, and missions (ﬁeld operations)
of the OSCE. “Good oﬃces” and electoral missions are excluded; as such this article does not
include EU Special Representatives or Delegations, UN country teams, special coordinators
or regional centres, or OSCE personal envoys.
2. 29 interviews were carried out, on the basis of anonymity, with key stakeholders (EU, UN,
OSCE, diplomatic community, NGOs and think tank experts) in these countries between
November 2016 and March 2017.
3. For comparisons between international organizations and military functions, see Mattelaer,
2013; Dijkstra, 2016.
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